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Abstract
Differential privacy(DP) has now become a standard in case of sen-
sitive statistical data analysis. The two main approaches in DP is local
and central. Both the approaches have a clear gap in terms of data stor-
ing,amount of data to be analyzed, analysis, speed etc. Local wins on the
speed. We have tested the state of the art standard RAPPOR which is a
local approach and supported this gap. Our work completely focuses on
that part too. Here, we propose a model which initially collects RAPPOR
reports from multiple clients which are then pushed to a Tf-Idf estima-
tion model. The Tf-Idf estimation model then estimates the reports on
the basis of the occurrence of ”on bit” in a particular position and its
contribution to that position. Thus it generates a centralized differential
privacy analysis from multiple clients. Our model successfully and effi-
ciently analyzed the major truth value every time.
Keywords: Differential Privacy , Anonymity , Security , RAPPOR ,
Tf-Idf
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1 Introduction
’Privacy’ [1] is defined as - ”a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other
things) freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home,
control over personal information, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s
reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations”. Privacy is a term
used to describe an individual’s anonymity and how safe they feel in a location
preferably in Internet, which is one of the most sensitive and concerned ’con-
cept’ at present. In the current situation crowd sourcing is the most popular
source of collecting data directly from people for many research topics. Gener-
ally it is being done through several online site or portal in Internet. But there
are some basic issues regarding the whole survey process, like (a) the system
of survey should be convincing enough to gain the participants trust ,(b) the
processes after the survey should be effective enough to ensure the ‘truthfulness’
of the participants to the researchers, (c) The processes of research should be
robust enough to guarantee the leak proof of the research architecture model,
(d) The system of survey should still produce a ‘good result’ in terms of gain-
ing an insight of the problem in spite of the ‘noise’ in the data. Therefore it
promises a large research field in case of statistical databases where a leak of
small amount of data may lead to a personal identification which might be a
concern for that person in his or her personal life . The phenomenon of ’Re-
Identification’ was considered as a possibility at a time. However it has been
a wrong solution on its own. The re-identification approach has been proved
wrong by Lataniya Sweeney. She identified the medical information of the then
governor of Massachusetts- William Weld, using the publicly available insur-
ance data after cross checking it with the de-identified data published by the
state govt. in the year 1997. She mailed the same data to the governor too. A
probable solution regarding this phenomenon was given by Lataniya Sweeney
in her k-anonymity theorem[2]. However, k-anonymization does not include any
randomization and attackers can still make inferences about data sets that may
harm individuals. Hence, the arrival of ’differential privacy’ (DP). According
to Cynthia Dwork [3], in general - ” The outcome of any analysis is essen-
tially equally likely independent of whether any individual joins or refrains from
joining the dataset.” Therefore it implies that if a data analyst will not know
anything new about a person from a dataset of sensitive data when he/she is
not present in that dataset, as well as when he/she join the dataset too in case
if the dataset is maintaining the notion of DP.
There are two types of differential privacy - Centralized differential privacy
or CDP and Local differential privacy or LDP. They have their own pros and
cons in terms of data collection, data reservation, presence of trusted third party
data curator etc. The detail discussion and comparison between LDP and CDP
is discussed in the section 2.
There are some industry standard like RAPPOR[4] in Google, Apple’s Differ-
ential privacy [9] etc. in case of LDP. Also in case of CDP there is ESA architec-
ture and its PROCHLO implementation. RAPPOR is fast where PROCHLO is
expensive to implement. In CDP the centralized part helps the whole approach
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to be compatible with existing, standard software engineering processes which is
in succession helpful to use the industry standard known techniques(differentially-
private releases) to analyze[5] it. So, there is a clear gap between LDP and CDP
approach, which is definitely a great research area.
There has been some approaches regarding this area like - OUTIS [6], Am-
plification by shuffling: from local to central differential privacy via anonymity
[8] etc. OUTIS claims that it provides a bridge between LDP and CDP. OUTIS
provides an architecture for differential privacy that does not need any trusted
third party data curator like the CDP but still achieves the accuracy guaran-
tees and algorithmic expressibility like in the CDP approach, which gives the
possibility of ”best of both the world” in LDP and CDP. In the amplification
[8] model they provide a differential privacy algorithm that will be satisfied by
any  - invariant algorithm in the LDP as well as in the CDP model.
Our approach is to keep the best characteristics from both the LDP and
CDP. Here,
• We are taking the reports from the already industry standard RAPPOR
algorithm.
• Then we calculate the tf-idf value for all the positions where at least one ’on
bit’ has occurred with respect to the sample size after sampling multiple
times with different sample size.
• We get a constant attribution/ sample size always after sampling for a
constant number of occurrence of ’on bit’ in the reporting string of prr
and irr of RAPPOR.
• After that in the calculation step the weighted sum is being calculated.
The results are then stored in a separate database.
• This whole approach assures that no direct identification is possible in
case of cohort, prr or irr by the curator of the database or any attacker.
From our approach we contribute several things-
• The storing database in the server side becomes less in size.
• We are not storing anything other than the weighted sum only.
• The analysis phase is faster.
• Our model identifies the major ’True Value’ (which has the more occur-
rences in the samples) every time.
Our overall approach is to give a centralized environment to the RAPPOR
LDP model that will eventually give a more generalized bigger picture to en-
sure more differential privacy in a comparative faster way which is better than
the other centralized approach such as OUTIS[6], Amplification model[8] and
PROCHLO[5].
3
This paper is divided into six sections. After the introduction(in section-
1) part, we will discuss about the background theories in the related work(in
section-2) , then in the previous approach(in section-3) we will discuss about the
the previous approaches that helps us to set our aim to achieve the current result.
The last three sections all are devoted to talk about the architecture(in section-
4), results and analysis (in section-5) about our approach that will conclude(in
section-6) with our thought of future approach. The description of the acronyms
used in this paper is given in the following Table 1:
Table 1: Name and description of all the acronyms used
Name of the Acronyms Description
DP Differential Privacy.
LDP Local Differential Privacy.
CDP Central Differential Privacy
RAPPOR Randomized Aggregatable Privacy Pre-
serving Ordinal Response.
ESA Encode-Shuffle-Analyze
OUTIS A system for Crypto-Assisted Differen-
tial Privacy on Untrusted Servers.
2 Related Work
Differential privacy guarantees the following two things -
• the output of the differential privacy algorithm is definitely stable and
• only the forest of sampling and analysis is guaranteed which ensures that
if the input of a single user get changed it will not have any effect on the
output at all.
2.1 Differential Privacy
[3]“Differential privacy” describes a promise, made by a data holder or curator,
to a data subject: “You will not be affected, adversely or otherwise, by allowing
your data to be used in any study or analysis, no matter what other studies,
data sets, or information sources, are available.” The mathematical definition
after having the standard relaxation with an addition of δ will be as follows -
A randomized algorithm A : Dn → S satisfies (, δ) - differential privacy if
for all S ⊂ S and for all adjacent D, D′ ∈ D it holds that
Pr[(A(D) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ (1)
In Table 2 we have provided the essential explanation of the parameters in
the equation (1). From the above definition and [7] it is evident that differential
privacy is a good measure of the output stability in a randomized response
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Table 2: Description of all the parameters in the Differential Privacy
Name of the Parameters Description
data holder or curator The only trusted 3rd party person who
has the whole authority of the database.
data subject The producer of the data or the data
owners.
A Randomized algorithm
D and D′ They are adjacent inputs and
application-dependent. They must
differ in one of the n elements.
δ It is a small constant and is smaller
than 1/|D|.
Pr is the probability taken over after the
coin tossing of A.
S the range of the randomized algorithm
A
 Measure of how much privacy can be
lost.
technique when the input can change frequently from any single user.DP is of
two types:
2.1.1 Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
This is entirely depended on randomized response technique introduced in 1965
which is a simple response technique by the user depending on the coin toss
probability. This model was formally introduced by kasiviswanathan et al.[7]
In this model the distribution of a forest of data is always assured to be stable
even when a user can change his or her response suddenly. This simple trust
model is the main attraction of this model which is why it is the main adoption
in the industrial implementation now a days which does not even need a third
party assurance at all.
2.1.2 Central Differential Privacy (CDP)
Here the trusted data curator has the main role to play.The curator has the
responsibility to add the uncertainty by adding random noise which eventually
led to differential privacy. This whole process occurs entirely the untrusted data
analyst’s queries. As the answer to the queries always hold a small fraction of
data of the whole centralized dataset which helps to establish the differential
privacy phenomenon.
The comparison between CDP and LDP is in the Table 3
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Table 3: Comparison between LDP and CDP
LDP CDP
There is neither any trusted data cura-
tor nor any data preservation
Individual clients provide the data
and the data are stored in a trusted
database.
It assures that the report is produced by
individual client only where randomized
response of coin toss mechanism is used
to produce the report.
The curator release the final report us-
ing the Laplace distribution of noise to
hide the presence or absence of partic-
ular participant.
RAPPOR is the current state of
art mechanism for the google chrome
search engine which is very fast.
In comparison to RAPPOR it is slower
and expensive to implement.
2.2 Randomized Response Technique
It is introduced in 1965 by Stanly L.Warner [10], it is a very necessary and
effective technique in terms of structured survey, which helps the participants
to answer freely about the sensitive issues without being concerned about con-
fidentiality. The whole model is based on the participants’ truthfulness. It can
be interpreted like following -
Y A = p× EP + (1− p)(1− EP )
or, EP = (Y A+ p− 1)/(2p− 1) (2)
Table 4: Description of all the parameters in the Randomized Response Tech-
nique
Name of the Parameters Description
Y A The proportion of ’yes’- answer
p the probability to answer the sensitive
question.
A Randomized algorithm
EP the true proportion of those interviewed
bearing the embarrassing property
In Table 4 the description of the parameters are given. We can consider the
following example- Let’s ask a number of cancer patient under clinical obser-
vation, whether they have consumed the medicine today or not. They should
answer ‘YES’ if it is a 6 and answer truthfully if it otherwise, after flipping a
dice secretly which is unknown to the interviewer. Let the number of ‘YES’ is
55 out of 100 participants. Therefore Y A = 55/100= 11/20. Therefore p = 1/6.
therefore EP = 42.42% or true proportion of medicine taker is 42.42%.
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3 Previous Approaches
3.1 RAPPOR
Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response[4] or RAPPOR
is a industry standard open-source technology introduced by Google whose main
function is to get the raw data locally from the client software, anonymously with
the guarantee of differential privacy. They have applied randomized response
in a novel manner by the introduction of Bloom filter. RAPPOR always make
sure that the forest of client side strings can only get analyzed by the untrusted
analyst but not the other way around. It is a very good example of LDP. After
discussing CDP and it’s implementation PROCHLO in the next two paragraphs,
the difference between CDP and LDP will be more clear.
3.2 PROCHLO implementation of ESA
This is a very good example of CDP. The entire architecture of ESA or Encode,
Shuffle and Analyze to be precised is a three-step pipeline. PROCHLO [5] is the
real life implementation of ESA, with the introduction of stash shuffle, which is
a novel, scalable and efficient oblivious-shuffling algorithm using the Intel’s SGX
architecture. In this architecture there is a central database of encrypted records
which can only be decoded by a special analysis algorithm determined by the
corresponding decryption key. After that in the shuffling stage the data truly
become the part of the crowd with the assurance of that a threshold number of
reported items will surely be existed for every data partition. The analyze step
aggregates all the data partition publicly though the anonymity always intact.
In every step of ESA the differential privacy has been maintained [5]. They
have also taken the deep learning area into consideration and implement some
test cases with success. Kashiviswanathan et al[7] has stated that there exits an
exponential separation between the sampling complexity and accuracy in the
LDP and CDP algorithms. That’s why LDP requires a huge amount of data to
have a good population statistics. So the main gap between the CDP and the
LDP approach is mainly of four kinds, like -
• differencein necessary amount of data to produce a good population distri-
bution statistics,
• storage of data,
• difference in speed,
• last but not the least difference in approach.
ESA and its implementation PROCHLO [5] is a very good implementation
of CDP. We have already discussed it above.
As we have discussed before there have been some model proposed in recent
literature, like - OUTIS[6], Amplification by shuffling [8] etc. They have their
own pros and cons.
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3.3 Amplification Approach
In [8] erlingsson et al. have proposed an algorithm that gives a powerful am-
plificaiton technique, that any permutation invariant algorithm satisfying will
satisfy O(√log (1/δ)/n, δ) - central differential privacy. But their assumption
standardized on the basis of static population, which is not possible in real life.
Also they have ignored the implications of timing or traffic channels, which
should have been considered.This is a huge drawback comparison to the ESA
architecture.
3.4 OUTIS
OUTIS replaces a single trusted data curator by two untrusted non-collaborative
servers i.e. the CSP and the AS the third party association in the CDP model
is diminished. It gives the permission to the analysts to author the logical pro-
grams as logical programs always support the differential privacy, by restricting
the access of the sensitive data.
The main cons of this model are -
• Aggregation operators, Multi-table queries, Matrix multiplication does not
work in this environment.
• These servers are semi-honest ( this is achieved by linear homomorphic
encryption and Yao’s garbled circuits) which means they follow the proto-
cols honestly but their contents and computation can be observed by an
adversary.
• Privacy engine is not a strong point of this model.
• Too much work pressure on the AS part
• It starts off with a total privacy budget of B agreed upon by all the data
owners. So, there is an option that the privacy is not enough.
3.5 Initial Approaches
Our first approach was to make an environment where both the RAPPOR and
ESA will be implemented and will be chosen as per as the query requirement.
But for that approach, we have to implement the expensive ESA architecture
parallel to the RAPPOR algorithm. Also the query should be known before-
hand. That is why we did not implement this idea physically.
Our second approach was to use a Convolutional Neural Network layer on
top of the RAPPOR reports, which will eventually analyse the reports taking
combination of prr and irr [4] as training data in sets of samples. After training,
the model was not able to detect the true values beyond 2% of accuracy which
was really poor. The main reason behind our failure was mainly for overfitting
due to the inbuilt noise from randomized response sampling in the prr and irr
combination.
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Our target from the beginning is to build an analysis technique which will
follow the CDP, as well as easy to understand, robust, fast and cheap in im-
plement. All these points have also been discussed in the previous sections
too. That’s why our third approach is to follow the already renowned TF-IDF
technique (mainly used in the information retrieval field for relevant decision
making)[12]. It is very easy to implement and as it follows the probabilistic
relevance of ’term’s (in our case ’on bit’ and ’off bit’ in the prr and irr string) in
a document as well as in a corpus of documents the analysis part became very
easy from our side. The details of our proposed architecture is being discussed
in the following section 4.
4 The ARA Architecture
Our aim is to build a CDP system that is cheap, fast, robust and less complex.
So, after two failed attempts we were success full to achieve at least a part of
what have we aimed. The following four subsections will explain the methodol-
ogy of our architecture, the data collection part and how both these parts has
built the system.
4.1 Tf-Idf
The full form of Tf-Idf is term frequency-inverse document frequency [11]. It
is mostly used to retrieve the ” probability-weighted amount of information ”
mainly in the field of feature extraction of machine learning, automatic term
extraction in computational terminology, information theoretic field, relative
decision making etc. Term Frequency measures the ”local relevance” [12] in a
specific document of a corpus of documents. So, it provides a direct estimation
of the probability of occurrence of a specific text or word after normalization
with respect to the scope of calculation. Inverse Document Frequency on the
other hand provide wide relevance in the whole document. The formula to
calculate TF is following-
TF (t, d) = f t,d/(number of words in d) (3)
where, t is the term and d is the document.
The formula to calculate IDF is following -
IDF (t, d) = log
N
1 + |dD : td| (4)
Where, N = Total number of documents in the corpus and |dD : td| is the
number of documents where t appears. If the term is not in the corpus, then
the IDF term will be undefined, that’s why it is being adjusted by adding ’1’ in
the denominator.
Therefore the total calculation is -
TF-IDF = TF (t, d)× IDF (t, d) (5)
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The explanation of all the parameters that have been used in the calculation of
TF-IDF is being listed in the Table 5.
Table 5: Description of all the parameters in the TF-IDF calculation
Name of the Parameters Description
TF (t, d) Term Frequency
t the required term
d Document in which the term t has oc-
curred
f t,d frequency of occurrence t in d
IDF (t, d) Inverse document frequency
N Total number of documents in the cor-
pus
1 + |dD : td| Number of documents where t has ap-
peared
4.2 Methodology
In our proposed ARA analysis model the actions are divided into three steps.
In the first step or in the Sampling step we have sampled the reports taken from
RAPPOR and calculated the TF-IDF value with the following formula for the
’prr’ and ’irr’ string -
TF-IDF =
N
S
× log10
32
S
(6)
Here N = count of ’on bit’ in the string and S = Sample Size.
After sampling (taking 100, 1000, 10000, 20000, 25000 samples at a time)
from the reports many times we could deduce the following two important
decisions-
• There are always a constant contribution from the ’on bit’s to the TF-IDF
value abiding the constant valueSample Size rule depending on the number of ’on bit’
in the string, for the whole sample size..
• As the size of our string is 32 bits, we also have deduced that there could
not be more than 17 ’on bit’ in a string.
The list of the constant with respect to the number of ’on bit’ in a string is
in Table 6
These constants values are being kept secret and the database curator or the
analyst only has the access to these constants. Also these constants are 1.1
times larger whenever the number of position gets lesser by one position.
In the second step or in the Weighted Sum calculation step we simply calcu-
late the weighted sum for each report consisting of cohort value, prr, irr and true
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Table 6: List of Constant contribution with respect to the number of ’on bit’ in
a string
Number of ’on bit’ in the string Constant Value Cv (v ranged from
1 - 17)
1 1.20201279
2 1.0927389
3 0.993399
4 0.90309
5 0.80618
6 0.727
7 0.660052
8 0.60206
9 0.550907
10 0.50515
11 0.4637573
12 0.425969
13 0.3912066
14 0.3590219
15 0.329059
16 0.30103
17 0.274701
value using the following formula (Description of parameters used in weighted
sum calculation step has been given in the Table 7) -
W = [Cprr × CCprr + C irr × C Cirr ]× V (7)
Here, W = weighted sum, Cprr = the count of ’on bit’ in the prr string, C irr
= the count of ’on bit’ in the irr string, V = cohort value, CCprr = constant
value from the table 6,CCirr = constant value from the table 6 . The description
of prr, irr, cohort is given in the [4]. If, V = 0 then the formula will be following
-
W = [Cprr × CCprr + C irr × C Cirr ] (8)
Table 7: Description of parameters used in weighted sum calculation step
Name of the Parameters Description
W Weighted Sum
Cprr the count of ’on bit’ in the prr string
C irr the count of ’on bit’ in the irr string
V cohort value
CCprr constant value from the table 6
CCirr constant value from the table 6
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. For experimental convenience, we have used 10 true values starting from
v1, v2, v3, ..., v10 and the range of cohort is 0 - 63. The calculated weighted
sum are then stored in a centralized database. Point to be noted that there are
only two attributes that we are storing - the constant values and the weighted
sums. Therefore there is no direct identification of the reports that is being
stored. So, the security is not harmed, as there are so many combination of
count of ’on bit’ in prr and irr with respect to the true values and cohort.
The third step is the last step. It is addressed as the Analysis Phase. Here
we take the testing samples of reports and then calculate the weighted sum
using the same formulas above and match them against the central database
and generate a report. The Data Flow in the proposed system is showed in the
Fig. 1
4.3 Data
We collected data after cloning the RAPPOR implementation in the Google
repository from GitHub [13] and running it more than hundred times. We made
our own datasets from the generated reports from running. For our convenience
we used only ten true values (v1, v2, v3, ..., v10) where RAPPOR has used
one hundred true values (v1, v2, v3, ..., v100). The distribution of the input
report is being shown in the Figure 2. As we can see the reports are already
distributed abiding the exponential distribution. So, there is already sufficient
noise implemented inside the reports. As it is an open source repository we do
not need to fetch the permission of authors to use these codes.
4.4 System Specification
Experiments were run on a Desktop Computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-
7700 CPU running at 3.60GHz using 8192 KB of cache memory on the Linux
18.04 UBUNTU OS with 1000 GB of HDD. It is a 64 bit system. It took
around 1.5 hour to complete one test set at a time. We wrote all our code
using R Studio, where R version 3.5.1 (2018-07-02) – ”Feather Spray” on the
Platform: x86 64-conda cos6-linux-gnu (64-bit) is used. All our codes have been
uploaded here [14].
5 Result and analysis
5.1 Result
For testing our model we have taken 1000 sample reports at a time consisting
of the cohort, prr and irr strings. We then test the set of reports for 100 times
each, against our model. We have done total 40 set of tests. After gaining the
count of the occurrence of a true value in the matching process which is being
described in the flow chart, the percentage achievement is simply the percentage
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calculation of the count against the sample size. The summary of the test results
is in the Table 8 .
5.2 Analysis
From the test part it is evident that, every time our model was able to detect
the major component out of the samples which has been collected from multiple
clients at a time. Though the percentage of achievement is an issue, but still
our model is fast. Also, the percentage of achievement and the sample size
is not depended on each other. It is being shown in the following graphical
representation in Figure 3 -
5.3 Comparison
We have outlined a comparison of our approach against current existing cen-
tral approaches ESA, OUTIS and Amplification Model in Table 9. However, a
direct comparison is not possible; given some of the approaches are hardware
approaches and some are purely theoretical whose implementations are rather
expensive and unavailable or currently do not exist respectively.
6 Conclusion
Privacy has been a long-established issue through decade. Though Differential
Privacy has paved a significance contribution in this area but the achievement in
the Local differential privacy area is still better in context of industry standard,
speed, utility, expensiveness etc. Our model is highlighted on these issues.The
goodness of our model are-
• It is fast in the analysis phase.
• The Centralized Database size is much smaller.
• The database does not store the reports for longer. Just the time for the
calculation of weight only.
• Accurately identify the major true value every time.
• Simple probabilistic approach towards analysis, which is not as complex
as OUTIS or PROCHLO.
• It maintains RAPPOR’s differential privacy promises.
The main drawback we get is the level of achievement is not more than 52.28%
in average. Also our model is not able to detect the second major component
with accuracy too. The utility and flexibility should be more too.
The drawbacks are definitely the motivation for our future work. But it is a
simple approach towards centralized differential privacy which is less complex in
13
framework and have an accessible computation. Therefore it is in turn definitely
a good contribution towards central differential privacy.
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Figure 1: Data flow in the ARA architecture
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Figure 2: Distribution of the Input reports arranged from RAPPOR
Figure 3: An Analysis between sample size and percentage of achievement
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Table 8: Summary of the Test Results
Total Sample Size 1000
Test No. Major True Value/
Component
Sample Limit Percentage of
Achievement
1 v1 30 - 300 46
2 v1 10 - 400 93.35
3 v1 0 - 500 72.2
4 v1 0 - 600 51.8
5 v2 0 - 300 32.4
6 v2 5 - 400 59.4
7 v2 0 - 500 31.33
8 v2 0 - 600 67.64
9 v3 0 - 300 60.9
10 v3 0 - 400 40.1
11 v3 5 - 500 43.7
12 v3 0 - 600 59.1
13 v4 50 - 300 33.1
14 v4 5 - 400 42.74
15 v4 0 - 500 87.9
16 v4 50 - 500 60.12
17 v4 0 - 600 68
18 v5 50 - 300 43.1
19 v5 0 - 400 49.82
20 v5 50 - 500 40.11
21 v5 5 - 600 53
22 v6 50 - 300 40.17
23 v6 50 - 400 63.4
24 v6 0 - 500 41.7
25 v6 20 - 600 53.1
26 v7 5 - 300 46.8
27 v7 0 - 400 45.2
28 v7 0 - 500 46.5
29 v7 0 - 600 65.53
30 v8 40 -300 46.3
31 v8 0 - 400 32.8
32 v8 0 - 500 63.5
33 v8 0 - 800 55.9
34 v9 10 - 400 60.3
35 v9 0 - 500 60.96
36 v9 5 - 600 66.92
37 v10 20 - 300 36.8
38 v10 20 - 400 37.8
39 v10 5 - 500 51.52
40 v10 0 - 600 40.1
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Table 9: Comparison with other models
Name of the Models Execution Time
ESA 4.1 hour for Encoder + Shuffler 1 for 10
million input
OUTIS Approximately 8 hours for Adult
dataset from University of California,
Irvine repository, with 32,651 data in
case of unoptimized OUTIS.
Amplification model Currently a theoretical approach. No
current implementation is available.
ARA Approximately 1.25 hours for one set
of complete analysis phase which con-
sists of 1000 randomly selected samples
and 100 times matching test against the
samples.
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